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CASE NOTES
Evidence-Impeachment of Witnesses-Illegally Obtained Statement Held
Admissible for Limited Purpose of Impeaching Defendant's Testimony.-
The defendant was indicted for manslaughter in the first degree. On the wit-
ness stand, testifying on his own behalf, the defendant stated that the deceased
came to his apartment at about three p.m. on May 8th; that she suffered an
epileptic fit and left bloodstains in his apartment; that the last time he saw her
was ten p.m. on May 8th when he fell asleep; and that he stayed home all day
on May 9th and did not see the deceased alive again.1 At the police station
before trial, after his request for counsel was denied, the defendant had stated
to a district attorney that he last saw the deceased on the morning of May 8th
when she left his apartment at 8:45 a.m.; and that he was not in his apartment
the remainder of May 8th or on May 9th.2 At trial, the prosecution did not use
this statement as part of its direct case, but did seek to use it to impeach the
credibility of the defendant. The New York court of appeals upheld the defen-
dant's conviction, stating that "although the statement would not have been
admissible as part of the People's direct case... it was admissible on the ques-
tion of defendant's credibility as a witness."13 People v. Kulis, 18 N.Y.2d 318,
221 N.E.2d 541, 274 N.Y.S.2d 873 (1966) (per curiam).
In Walder v. United States,4 the United States Supreme Court, in an opinion
by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, held that when a defendant in a federal criminal
case voluntarily takes the witness stand to testify on his own behalf, the prose-
cution may introduce unlawfully obtained evidence to impeach his testimony.
The defendant in Walder "went beyond a mere denial of complicity in the crimes
of which he was charged and made the sweeping claim that he had never dealt
in or possessed any narcotics." 5 The prosecution was then permitted to introduce
testimony that Walder had possessed narcotics. The heroin found in his posses-
sion had been obtained through an unlawful search and seizure. This evidence
was not relevant to the prosecution's direct case since the indictment was for
other transactions in narcotics.6 The Court was careful to observe that the de-
fendant "must be free to deny all the elements of the case against him without
thereby giving leave to the Government to introduce by way of rebuttal evidence
illegally secured by it, and therefore not available for its case in chief."7
1. Brief for Respondent, pp. 20-21, People v. Kulis, 18 N.Y.2d 318, 221 N.E.2d 541,
274 N.Y.S.2d 873 (1966) (per curiam).
2. Id. at 21.
3. People v. Kulis, 18 N.Y.2d 318, 322-23, 221 N.E.2d 541, 542, 274 N.Y-S2d 873, 875
(1966) (per curiam). The statements were illegally obtained under the rule in Escobedo v.
Illinois, 378 US. 478 (1964).
4. 347 US. 62 (1954).
5. Id. at 65.
6. Id. at 62-63.
7. Id. at 65. Many state courts following Walder chose not to allow that type of evi-
dence. See, e.g., People v. Underwood, 61 Cal. 2d 113, 389 P.2d 937 (1964); People v.
Hiller 2 Ill. 2d 323, 118 N.E.2d 11 (1954) ; State v. Brewton - Ore. -, 422 P.2d 581 (1967).
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In Inge v. United States,8 the Walder decision was discussed in the light of
subsequent circuit court holdings. The Inge court observed that the Walder
doctrine today should be viewed as permitting an inadmissible statement to be
used to impeach the voluntary testimony of the accused on his own behalf "only
when the defendant makes 'sweeping claims' that go far beyond the crime charged
... relating to 'lawful proper acts' 'collateral' to the issues before the jury, or
is questioned about 'minor points.' In such situations, impeachment of the de-
fendant affects only his credibility, since the truth of the impeaching statement
does not itself tend to establish guilt."9
In considering this issue for the first time, the instant court declined to fol-
low the extremely pertinent dictum in Miranda v. Arizona.10 Mr. Chief Justice
Warren, writing for the majority in that case, said that "statements merely
intended to be exculpatory by the defendant are often used to impeach his
testimony at trial or to demonstrate untruths in the statement given under
interrogation and thus to prove guilt by implication. These statements are in-
criminating in any meaningful sense of the word and may not be used without
the full warnings and effective waiver required for any other statement."" Judge
Keating, in his dissent to the present case, suggested that Miranda "adequately
disposes of any distinction between statements used on direct as opposed to
cross-examination.' 12
The rationale underlying any exclusionary rule is to protect society as well
as the individual.'3 The Supreme Court has indicated that the most effective
deterrent to illegal police activity is to hold the evidence inadmissible. 14 If the
purpose of excluding the evidence is merely to deter illegal police activity it can
be argued that to overrule Walder may not be necessary; that to exclude the
use of the evidence in the direct case is an adequate deterrent.', However, in a
recent decision, 6 the highest court of Oregon refused to follow the Walder doc-
Contra, Commonwealth v. Wright, 415 Pa. 55, 202 A.2d 79 (1964). See generally Annot., 89
A.L.R.2d 478 (1963). But see, e.g., State v. McClung, 66 Wash. 2d 654, 404 P.2d 460 (1965),
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1013 (1966).
8. 356 F.2d 345 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
9. Id. at 349. (Footnotes omitted.)
10. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The Miranda holding was not applicable to the instant case.
See Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966); People v. McQueen, 18 N.Y.2d 337,
221 N.E.2d 550, 274 N.Y.S.2d 886 (1966).
11. 384 U.S. at 477 (dictum).
12. 18 N.Y.2d at 324, 221 N.E.2d at 543, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 876 (dissenting opinion). Judge
Keating went on to say that Miranda makes the Walder rule "of doubtful validity." Ibid.
See Pye, in Interrogation of Criminal Defendants-Some Views on Miranda v. Arizona,
35 Fordham L. Rev. 199, 218-19(1966). Even before Miranda, the Walder decision was
criticized on constitutional grounds. 1 Wigmore, Evidence § 15, at 70 (3d ed. Supp. 1964).
13. See Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207 (1960). See also Escobedo v. Illinois,
378 U.S. 478, 490 (1964).
14. E.g., Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636-37 (1965).
15. See United States v. Curry, 358 F.2d 904, 911 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 873
(1966).
16. State v. Brewton, - Ore. -, 422 P.2d 581 (1967).
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trine and suggested that the admission of otherwise inadmissible evidence, even
for such a limited purpose, invites the overzealous police officer to obtain evi-
dence by unconstitutional means and hold it on file to be used should the defen-
dant elect to testify on his own behalf at some later trial.' 7
In any event, the exclusionary rule may be justified by policies other than
merely deterring police officers from illegal actions.' 8 Perhaps our concepts of
a fair procedure require that a conviction be obtained unaided by any violation
of the defendant's constitutional guarantees, regardless of any need for deter-
rence.' 9 This is certainly the thrust of the Miranda decision, and perhaps of
Mapp v. Ohio as well. 20 Under this view, no distinctions based on the prosecu-
tion's purpose in introducing the evidence are permitted. Once the evidence is
tainted, it must be completely excluded. In other words, the Walder case cannot
stand as to confessions or admissions in light of Miranda; and, absent a basis
for the distinction of real evidence, 21 it cannot stand at all.22
Unless Walder is expressly overruled, however, continued adherence to it by
state courts reluctant to expand criminal due process protections is to be ex-
pected. These courts must observe the limitations on the Walder rule. While the
evidence in question in the instant case was not relevant to the indictment in
the sense of directly proving guilt, it did tend to disprove the alibi offered by
the defendant on the witness stand. Walder was clear in leaving the defendant
"free to deny all the elements of the case against him. .. ."-3 This must allow
the defendant to testify as to his whereabouts at the time the crime was com-
mitted. 24 On this ground, at least, the present court was incorrect in allowing
the admission of the evidence.
17. Id. at -, 442 P.2d at 583.
18. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), where the Court stated that "'the rele%-ant
rules of evidence' are overridden without regard to 'the incidence of such conduct by the
police'. .. ." Id. at 656.
19. Mr. Justice Black, dissenting in Linkletter v. Walker, referred to "trial protections
guaranteed by the Constitution." 381 U.S. 618, 650 (1965).
20. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655
(1961). But see Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636-37 (1965), where the Court stressed
deterrence as the underlying purpose of the exclusionary rule set forth in Mapp. However, the
Court there was justifying its denial of retroactivity to the Mapp rule.
21. It has been suggested that the greater reliability of real evidence provides a basis for
distinction. See, e.g., 4 Houston L. Rev. 144, 147-49 (1966). In rebuttal, first, real evidence
is not inevitably reliable, such as when its authenticity depends on more or less reliable
testimonial proof; and secondly, it would appear that the overriding fact of an infringement
of a constitutional guarantee would obliterate any differences of relative reliability.
22. In United States v. Curry, 358 F.2d 904 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 873 (1966),
the court did "not agree that the Walder doctrine was in any way weakened by Mapp .... "
Id. at 911. Its reasoning was tenuous. The Court in Mapp stated that "a federal prosecutor
may make no use of evidence illegally seized," 367 U.S. at 657, and in any event the Miranda
dictum, quoted in text accompanying note 11 supra, seems completely to dispose of Walder.
23. 347 U.S. at 65.
24. See Inge v. United States, 356 F.2d 345, 349 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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Jurisdiction-Exercise of Jurisdiction Over a Newspaper Vacated on the
Basis of the First Amendent.-The plaintiff, a city commissioner of Birming-
ham, Alabama, sought to recover for an alleged libel printed by the defendant
New York Times Company.1 Jurisdiction was acquired by substituted service
pursuant to the Alabama long-arm statute.2 The defendant's claim, rejected by
the United States district court for northern Alabama,8 was that the exercise of
jurisdiction was a violation of due process and the first amendment. The United
States court of appeals sustained this claim and reversed. New York Times Co.
v. Connor, 365 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1966).
It is settled, in the absence of personal service of a summons upon a defendant
1. The original service of process was made pursuant to the Alabama long-arm statute:
"Service on nonresident doing business or performing work or service in state.-Any ...
corporation not qualified under the Constitution and laws of this state as to doing business
herein, who shall do any business or perform any character of work or service In this state
shall, by the doing of such busines or the performing of such work, or services, be deemed to
have appointed the secretary of state, or his successor or successors in office, to be the true
and lawful attorney or agent of such nonresident, upon whom process may be served in any
action accrued or accruing from the doing of such business, or the performing of such work,
or service, or as an incident thereto by any such nonresident, or his, its or their agent, ser-
vant or employee." Ala. Acts 1953, No. 282. The section was amended subsequent to the in-
stant case. Ala. Code tit. 7, § 199(1) (Supp. 1965).
On interlocutory appeal, the United States court of appeals for the Fifth Circuit quashed
the service on the ground that Alabama followed the single publication rule. The single pub-
lication rule in libel actions provides that the tort occurs only at the place where the news-
paper is printed. New York Times Co. v. Connor, 291 F.2d 492, 494 (5th Cir. 1961). The
rule, in effect, treats "an entire edition of a newspaper, magazine or book . . . as only one
publication, and the plaintiff is permitted to plead and prove merely a general distribution
of the libel and show the extent of the circulation as evidence bearing on the damages."
Prosser, Torts § 108, at 788 (3d ed. 1964). (Footnotes omitted.) The service was thus im-
proper for failure to meet the statutory requirement "that the cause of action must have
accrued ... from some business ... or service there." New York Times Co. v. Connor, 291
F.2d 492, 496 (5th Cir. 1961). But see Buckley v. New York Post Corp., No. 30757, 2d Cir.,
Jan. 10, 1967.
The plaintiff amended his complaint to allege a cause of action arising from the Times'
distribution in Alabama. The United States district court for the Northern District of Ala-
bama dismissed because "'no new matter not heretofore ruled on'" was presented. 365 F.2d
at 569. This decision was appealed to the Fifth Circuit. Prior to the argument of the appeal,
the Alabama supreme court held in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 273 Ala. 656, 144 So. 2d
25 (1962), rev'd on other grounds, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), that the Fifth Circuit's statement
of Alabama law, made when quashing service in the instant case, was erroneous. 273 Ala. at
687, 144 So. 2d at 51. The court held that the Alabama long-arm statute was intended to go
to the constitutional limits of due process, id. at 670, 144 So. 2d at 34, and that the distribu-
tion of a libel in Alabama, though printed elsewhere, raised a cause of action in Alabama. Id.
at 687, 144 So. 2d at 51.
The Fifth Circuit then remanded the case to the district court for a trial on the merits,
withholding decision of the constitutional questions. Connor v. New York Times Co., 310
F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1962).
2. Ala. Acts 1953, No. 282 (now Ala. Code tit. 7, § 199(1) (Supp. 1965)).
3. 365 F.2d at 569.
within a state, that the defendant must have certain minimum contacts with the
state if an exercise of personal jurisdiction is to be consistent with the require-
ments of due process.4 The instant court found the Times' contacts with the state
of Alabama to be as follows:
The New York Times Company is a New York corporation which ... . maintains no
office, employees or agents in Alabama. Newspapers are mailed directly from New
York... and payment is due in New York. Staff correspondents, other than [Har-
rison] Salisbury [who wrote the stories alleged to have been libelous], had visited
Alabama on seven occasions during a period from April 1, 1959, to August 22, 1960.
The Times sometimes purchased stories at a certain rate per word from [part-time]
independent correspondents [called stringers] located in Alabama . . . .During the
period mentioned above, The Times paid Alabama stringers ... $415. Five times
during this period, Times employees visited Alabama soliciting prospective adver-
tisers. Alabama advertising accounted for approximately 25/1000 to 46/1000 of
1% of the total Times advertising revenue. Average daily circulation in Alabama was
some 395 copies out of a total approximate circulation of 650,000. Sunday circula-
tion ... was about 2,455 out of roughly 1,300,000. Alabama sales revenue accounted
for some 23/100 of 1% of the total sales revenue.5
The court found6 that these contacts were virtually the same as those which,
in Buckley v. New York Times Co., 7 were found insufficient 8 to satisfy due
process of law. Buckley held that during the pertinent period the "'quality and
nature' "9 of these newspaper companies' business activities was not "'continu-
ous and systematic.' "10 The court found, rather, that these activities amounted
to at most a" 'casual presence' "" in Louisiana-insufficient to deem it reason-
able, within the due process requirements, for Louisiana to enforce obligations
arising from these activities.'"
To apply Buckley to the present case, the court had to distinguish its own
intervening decision in Elkhart Eng'r Corp. v. Dornier Werke.13 In the latter
case, long-arm jurisdiction was upheld in favor of a Wisconsin corporation and
against a German corporation for damage to the former's airplane, which was
being demonstrated by the defendant in Alabama. This single transaction was
4. E.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958); McGee v. International Life Ins.
Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222 (1957); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316
(1945).
5. 365 F.2d at 570.
6. Ibid.
7. 338 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1964), 39 Tul. L. Rev. 927 (1965).
8. 338 F.2d at 472-75.
9. Id. at 475.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid. In applying Buckley to the instant case, the instant court rejected a concurring
opinion by Judge Rives of the Fifth Circuit in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Birdsong, 360 F2d
344, 348 (5th Cir. 1966), which suggested that the Alabama long-arm statute was broader
than the Louisiana statute. The instant court found that the Louisiana statute was in fact as
broad as the limits of due process and thus as broad as the Alabama statute. 365 F.2d at 571.
13. 343 F.2d 861 (5th Cir. 1965).
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held to be a transaction of business within Alabama and, therefore, service upon
the defendant pursuant to the state's long-arm statute was consistent with due
process of law. The Elkhart court, in construing the Supreme Court opinions in
International Shoe Co. v. Washington14 and McGee v. International Lije Ins.
Co."' noted that
Alabama may, consistent with the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
assert jurisdiction over a non-resident, non-qualifying corporation in suits on a
claim of liability for tortious injury arising out of activity of the non-resident within
the state, even though only a single transaction is involved, and regardless of whether
the activity is considered dangerous.16
To avoid the broad Elkhart policy, the instant court held that "First Amend-
ment considerations surrounding the law of libel require a greater showing of
contact to satisfy the due process clause than is necessary in asserting jurisdic-
tion over other types of tortious activity."' 7 The court noted' 8 that this distinc-
tion was suggested in Walker v. Savell.19 There, however, the court found that
it was
the policy of the state of Mississippi to require a much stricter showing of the doing
of business within that state by a foreign newspaper . . . before it is to be held
amenable to local service in a libel suit than would be the case in a suit against an
ordinary . . . corporation. We think there is reason for such a distinction because
of the inherent danger or threat to the free exercise of the right of freedom of the
press if jurisdiction in every state can be inferred from minimal contacts. 2 0
But the Walker court was not required to decide whether Mississippi's choice
was a constitutional necessity.
The present court also found supportable language in the analogous cases of
Grosjean v. American Press Co.2' and NAACP v. Button.22 In Grosjean, a tax
"with the plain purpose of penalizing the publishers and curtailing the circula.
tion of a selected group of newspapers" was found unconstitutional as in-
fringing on the freedom of the press,23 and in Button, statutes which regulated
the legal operations of the NAACP were found unconstitutional as an encroach-
ment on freedom of expression. In Button, Mr. Justice Brennan wrote that "be-
cause First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive, government
may regulate in the area only with narrow specificity. '24 Subjecting a newspaper
to libel suits in faraway jurisdictions may well be a burden on expression, but
14. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
15. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
16. 343 F.2d at 868.
17. 365 F.2d at 572.
18. Ibid.
19. 335 F.2d 536 (5th Cir. 1964).
20. Id. at 544.
21. 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
22. 371 U.S. 416 (1963).
23. 297 U.S. at 251.
24. 371 U.S. at 433.
it is questionable whether the burden is as heavy or of the same character as
the restrictions on the first and fourteenth amendment freedoms present in the
Grosjean and Button cases. The Supreme Court noted in Grosjean that the tax
there was "a deliberate and calculated device in the guise of a tax to limit the
circulation of information to which the public is entitled in virtue of the con-
stitutional guaranties." 25 The exercise of jurisdiction over a newspaper as a
result of a published libel can hardly be said to be deliberately calculated "to
limit the circulation of information to which the public is entitled . . . .
In refusing to apply Elkhart to the instant case the court offered a policy
argument, namely, that the circulation of a single copy of the newspaper could
subject a foreign newspaper "to libel actions and the risk of large judgments at
the hands of local juries incensed by the out-of-state newspaper's coverage of
local events." 27 The court questioned whether a newspaper in the face of such
a risk would freely circulate "in any state where the size of ... circulation does
not balance the danger of this liability."2 8 The court argued that if service of
process were permitted in the instant case it would discourage out-of-state news-
papers from circulating in Alabama and thus deprive Alabama citizens of free
access to these newspapers..2 9 However, the other side of this coin is that if Ala-
bama citizens are to be able to read the New York Times, they must forego the
right to recover for defamation in their own courts, even though the libel be
transmitted to third parties within their state. Although freedom of the press has
been held to be so inviolable that publication cannot be enjoined, nevertheless,
the press must be prepared to answer, as are all persons, for torts committed
through publication.30
25. 297 U.S. at 250.
26. Ibid.
27. 365 F.2d at 572.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid. See also Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
Early this year the Second Circuit in Buckley v. New York Post Corp, No. 30757, 2d
Cir., Jan. 10, 1967, found minimum contacts in permitting long-arm jurisdiction over
the defendant newspaper under the tortious act provision in the Connecticut long-arm statute.
Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. § 33-411 (c) (4) (1962). The court refused to use the first amendment
to increase the minimum contacts requirement, thus specifically rejecting the Fifth Circuit's
theory in Connor. Nor would it allow the single publication rule to upset the result. It must
be remembered, however, that this case involved no hardship to the defendant, which was
required to travel only forty miles to defend.
30. A possible theory in support of allowing long-arm jurisdiction in libel cases is the
nexus between the cause of action and the community in which the plaintiff resides. A plain-
tiff might be entitled to have a judge and jury selected from the community in which he
suffers the principal damage to his reputation. They may be best able to determine local
sentiments and resolve ambiguities and might be in the best position to compute damages.
See Comment, 67 Colum. L. Rev. 342, 363 (1967). These advantages must be measured
against the defendant's right to a fair and impartial jury. Since punitive damages were sought
in the instant case, the proceeding was quasi-criminal in nature; therefore, the reasons which
would normally compel a change of venue, namely local prejudice, might also inveigh against
allowing jurisdiction.
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The instant court could have found the service of process constitutional on
one of two theories. First, under the authority of Elkhart, there was sufficient
business activity to predicate the service on the transaction of business. The New
York Times, by sending news-gathering agents into Alabama and by distributing
130,000 newspapers annually in Alabama, would appear to have contacts suf-
ficient to satisfy due process of law.3 ' Secondly, perhaps jurisdiction could have
been predicated on the seriousness of the tortious act committed in the state.32
In Hess v. Pawloski,83 the Court found the commission of a single tortious act
within a state sufficient to give the courts of that state jurisdiction over the tort-
feasor.3 4 Since Alabama has abrogated the "single publication" rule,85 a tortious
act was committed by the New York Times in Alabama by circulating the libel.8"
It may be good public policy out of simple deference to the first amendment,
to give newspapers protection commensurate with their first amendment activ-
ities and under appropriate circumstances greater protection than other business
organizations. However, it is another thing to conclude that the Constitution
demands that newspapers, such as the New York Times, whose circulation is not
limited to a particular community or to a particular jurisdiction, be answerable
for libel only in that jurisdiction where it is actually published. For it appears
to be valid to conclude from the present case that, if the Times is not answerable
in Alabama where it libels a citizen, it may not be answerable in any state of the
United States save New York.
31. See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957), where jurisdiction was
predicated on the fact that a single insurance policy was sold within the state of California.
32. The Alabama supreme court has stated that its long-arm statute goes to the limits of
due process. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 273 Ala. 656, 670, 144 So. 2d 25, 34 (1962),
rev'd on other grounds, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Although the statute speaks only of "doing
business," it is arguable that, since the statute goes "to the limits of due process" with respect
to long-arm jurisdiction, it encompasses a tortious act committed within its state. Jurisdiction
is measured in terms of contacts and is far broader than the requirement of "doing business."
If this interpretation was not intended by the Alabama supreme court, the jurisdiction must
then be predicated solely on the theory of "doing business." Ala. Acts 1953, No. 282 (now
Ala. Code tit. 7, § 199(1) (Supp. 1965)).
If both theories are available, "doing business" may be the better because of the occasional
difficulty of determining the situs of a tortious act. See, e.g., Platt Corp. v. Platt, 17 N.Y.2d
234, 217 N.E.2d 134, 270 N.Y.S.2d 408 (1966), 35 Fordham L. Rev. 363; Longines-Wlttnauer
Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., 15 N.Y.2d 443, 209 N.E.2d 68, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1965),
34 Fordham L. Rev. 344.
33. 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
34. Id. at 356. This case is often cited with International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310 (1945), in finding "single act" type long-arm statutes constitutional.
35. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 273 Ala. 656, 670, 144 So. 2d 25, 34 (1962), rev'd
on other grounds, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
36. See ibid.
Limited Partuership-Limited Partner Permitted To Bring a Derivative
Action.-Riviera Congress Associates, a New York limited partnership, granted
Yassky Corporation a lease on a motel. Through a series of leases, sub-leases
and assignments,1 the motel came into the hands of Mid-Manhattan Associates,
another limited partnership which had as its general partners the four general
partners of Riviera Congress. The limited partners of Riviera Congress brought
an action in the name of the partnership for the rent due from Mid-Manbattan
Mid-Manhattan set up as a defense a release given by the general partners of
Riviera Congress. The plaintiffs claimed that the release was invalid since it
had been given by the defendants, as general partners of Riviera Congress, to
themselves, as general partners of Mid-Manhattan. The appellate division, in
denying the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, also denied the plaintiffs'
right to maintain a derivative or class action.3 A unanimous court of appeals, per
Judge Fuld, found issues of fact 4 and therefore affirmed the appellate division
with respect to the denial of summary judgment. But the court further held that
"the plaintiffs are authorized to sue as limited partners on behalf of the partner-
ship entity to enforce a partnership claim when those in control of the business
wrongfully decline to do so."15 Riviera Congress Associates v. Yassky, 18 N.Y.2d
540, 223 N.E.2d 876, 277 N.Y.S.2d 386 (1966).
The instant court had before it at least three basic questions of partnership
law which previously had been unsettled. The court had to decide whether a
limited partnership constituted a separate entity, apart from its individual
members, through which or on behalf of which a limited partner could bring
a derivative suit. That issue raised the problem of whether the initiation and
1. The complete series of transactions was as follows: Riviera Congress Associates entered
into a twenty-year lease with Yassky Corporation, a corporation controlled by the four
general partners of Riviera Congress. Yassky Corporation, with the consent of the general
partners of Riviera Congress, assigned the lease to the Riviera Corporation, another com-
pany wholly owned and operated by the four general partners of Riviera Congress. Riviera
Corporation assigned its interest to Mid-Manhattan Associates, another limited partnership
whose general partners were again the four general partners of Riviera Congress. Mid-
Manhattan subleased the premises back to the Riviera Corporation. When severe operating
losses were sustained, Mid-Manhattan Associates, with the approval of Riviera Congress,
assigned its interest in the lease to Mid-Manhattan Hotel Associates, Inc, another corpora-
tion owned and operated by the four individual defendants. Shortly thereafter, the lease
was re-assigned to Riviera Congress Associates, Inc. The Riviera Corporation then assigned
its sublease to Riviera Congress Associates, Inc., thus placing Riviera Congress Associates in
possession of the motel without a tenant. Riviera Congress Associates v. Yassky, 18 N.Y.2d
540, 543-44, 223 N.E.2d 876, 877-78, 277 N.Y.S.2d 386, 388-89 (1966).
2. Id. at 545, 223 N.E.2d at 878, 277 N.Y.S.2d at 390 (1966).
3. 25 App. Div. 2d 291, 296, 268 N.Y.S.2d 854, 859 (1st Dep't), aifd, 18 N.Y.2d 540,
223 N.E.2d 876, 277 N.YS.2d 386 (1966).
4. The prospectus sent out to the limited partners indicated that self-dealing would be
involved and the partnership agreement itself permitted such activity. The unresolved
question was whether general partners had kept within the limits of these documents. 18
N.Y.2d at 548-49, 223 N.E.2d at 880, 277 N.Y.S.2d at 393.
5. Id. at 547, 223 N.E.2d at 879, 277 N.Y.S.2d at 391.
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prosecution of such a suit would render the limited partners liable as general
partners for participating in the management of the partnership. Finally, the
court had to determine whether the wrongful failure of the general partners to
enforce partnership rights was a breach of duty which would gain for the limited
partners the right to bring a derivative suit on behalf of the limited partnership.
The conflict between the aggregate and entity concepts of the partnership
personality has long plagued the courts. 6 The problem stems primarily from
the omission of a section contained in the original drafts of the Uniform Part-
nership Act, which specifically defined a partnership as having an existence apart
from that of its members.7 This underlying intention is reflected in many other
sections of the act,8 which retained the entity theory, despite the exclusion of
an express provision. Consequently, the courts and the legislature of New York
have had to determine, in ad hoc fashion, if and when a partnership should
be considered an entity.9 Furthermore, the courts have been reluctant to take
it upon themselves to modify the traditional aggregate concept.10 Perhaps the
most notable concession in New York, prior to the instant case, occurred in
Ruzicka v. Rager," where the court considered a limited partnership "as a
distinct entity for the purposes of pleading."' 2 However, the courts of New York
long considered the favor granted in Ruzicka as a point beyond which they were
unwilling to move.'
6. See, e.g., Caplan v. Caplan, 268 N.Y. 445, 198 N.E. 23 (1935) (partnership not an
entity for purpose of tort liability); Hartigan v. Casualty Co. of America, 227 N.Y. 175,
124 N.E. 789 (1919) (insurance policy insured the partnership as an entity, not the partners
as aggregate members). See also George A. Hamid & Son v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 14 App.
Div. 2d 107, 217 N.Y.S.2d 219 (1st Dep't 1961), aff'd, 13 N.Y.2d 635, 191 N.E.2d 96, 240
N.Y.S.2d 613 (1963) (memorandum decision).
7. See Lewis, The Uniform Partnership Act-A Reply to Mr. Crane's Criticism, 29 Harv.
L. Rev. 158, 159 (1915); Crane, The Uniform Partnership Act-A Criticism, 28 Harv. L.
Rev. 762, 769 (1915). A limited partnership under the Uniform Limited Partnership Act is
not given an existence apart from its members. See Uniform Limited Partnership Act § 1;
N.Y. Partnership Law § 90. As a result the ambiguity caused by the conflict between the
entity and aggregate theories present under the Uniform Partnership Act is also present
under the Uniform Limited Partnership Act.
8. See Jensen, Is a Partnership Under the Uniform Partnership Act an Aggregate or an
Entity?, 16 Vand. L. Rev. 377, 379 & n.11 (1963). See also N.Y. Partnership Law §§ 2, 20,
21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 40, 41, 43, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 61, 66(1)(b), 71(a) (II), 71(h), 71(1).
9. See, e.g., In re Schwartzman, 288 N.Y. 568, 42 N.E.2d 22 (1942) (memorandum
decision) (treating partnership as an entity under N.Y. Lab. Law § 502(3)); Ruzicka v.
Rager, 305 N.Y. 191, 111 N.E.2d 878 (1953) (treating partnership as an entity for purposes
of pleading). See also N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1025.
10. See, e.g., Williams v. Hartshorn, 296 N.Y. 49, 51, 69 N.E.2d 557, 559 (1946): "While
the Legislature has the right to consider a partnership apart from its members ...in the
absence of such legislative treatment, a partnership is not to be regarded as a separate
entity distinct from the persons who compose it."
11. 305 N.Y. 191, 111 N.E.2d 878 (1953).
12. Id. at 197, 111 N.E.2d at 882.
13. See, e.g., Millard v. Newmark & Co., 24 App. Div. 2d 333, 336, 266 N.Y.S,2d 254,
259 (1st Dep't 1966). But see Klebanow v. New York Produce Excb., 344 F.2d 294 (2d Cir.
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The holding of the instant court was explicit in referring to the partnership
as an entity,14 at least for the purposes of bringing a derivative suit. Unfortu-
nately, the court referred to Williams v. Hartshorn,'9 which was itself explicit
in its denial of the entity status, except when so treated by legislative enact-
ment.16 It could be argued that the instant court was overruling Williams only
insofar as its dictum would have been a bar to the commencement of a derivative
action by a limited partner. On the other hand, the holding of the court might
be interpreted as having a more far reaching effect, since the court in no way
qualified or limited its reference to the partnership entity.
The instant court was somewhat more explicit in its treatment of the second
problem which it had before it. Prior to this decision, there was some doubt
with respect to what effect participation by a limited partner would have on his
status as such.1 7 Originally, almost any participation in the management of the
limited partnership on the part of the limited partner would result in his being
deemed a general partner' s or being held liable as a general partner.1 9 The
adoption of the Uniform Limited Partnership Act had an ameliorative effect - o
by permitting certain activities. The areas in which a limited partner may take
an active part are determined by statute.2 1 By exceeding these bounds the limited
partner runs the risk of unlimited liability.22 The controversy in the instant case
centered around section 115 of the New York Partnership Law, which provides
that "a contributor, unless he is a general partner, is not a proper party to pro-
ceedings by or against a partnership, except where the object is to enforce a
limited partner's right against or liability to the partnership."23 This could be,
1965). There the court, purporting to apply New York law, allowed a limited partner to
bring a derivative suit. The court found no support in New York law for treating a limited
partnership as an entity for this purpose; instead, the court relied on § 4 of the Clayton
Act, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964), in order to deem "the partnership rather
than a partner as the person injured." 344 F.2d at 296. See Comment, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 1463,
1474 (1965).
14. 18 N.Y.2d at 547, 223 N.E.2d at 879, 277 N.YS.2d at 391.
15. 296 N.Y. 49, 69 N.E.2d 557 (1946).
16. Id. at 51, 69 N.E.2d at 559.
17. See, e.g., Riviera Congress Associates v. Yassky, 25 App. Div. 2d 291, 296, 268
N.Y.S.2d 854, 859; Executive Hotel Associates v. Elm Hotel Corp., 41 Misc. 2d 354, 359, 245
N.Y.S.2d 929, 933 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct.), aff'd mem., 43 Misc. 2d 153, 250 N.YS.2d 351 (App.
T. 1964) (limited partner permitted to act as general partner only after assuming liability as
a general partner).
18. See, e.g., Hogg v. Ellis, 8 How. Pr. 473 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1853).
19. See, e.g., Casola v. Kugelman, 33 App. Div. 428, 54 N.Y. Supp. 89 (1st Dep't 1898),
aff'd sub nom. Casola v. Vasquez, 164 N.Y. 608, 58 N.E. 1085 (1900); Bulkley v. Dingman,
11 Barb. 289 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1851); Lewis, The Uniform Limited Partnership Act, 65 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 715, 720 (1917).
20. See Comment, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 1463, 1465 (1965).
21. See, e.g., N.Y. Partnership Law §§ 98, 99, 102, 104 and 108.
22. See, e.g., N.Y. Partnership Law § 96: "A limited partner shall not become liable as a
general partner unless, in addition to the exercise of his rights and powers as a limited
partner, he takes part in the control of the business."
23. This section is identical to Uniform Limited Partnership Act § 26.
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and often has been, put forth as a very strong argument against allowing the
limited partner the right to sue on behalf of the partnership. Some courts have
stated expressly that this section absolutely bars any action by the limited part-
ner, except as provided under the statute.24 However, a federal court 25 and
several lower courts in New York 26 expressed some doubt as to whether section
115 by itself was a complete bar to action on the part of a limited partner under
all circumstances.
Those courts which favored a more liberal interpretation of the section at-
tempted to demonstrate that the purposes of a limited partnership, and section
115 in particular, would best be served by such an interpretation. These courts
felt that section 115 was intended only to prevent limited partners from inter-
fering in the management of the partnership.27
One of the more significant purposes of a limited partnership is the encourage-
ment of investment. 28 This purpose would certainly be thwarted if the limited
partners knew that they would be confronted with two equally discouraging
alternatives, should a general partner refuse to bring an action to vindicate a
wrong done to the partnership. The limited partner could meekly acquiesce in
the general partner's inaction and the loss which would result, or the limited
partner could himself bring the action and run the risk of substantially increased
liability.
One reason offered for not permitting a limited partner to take an active role
in the business of the partnership is that creditors would not want the partner-
ship managed by one who would not be liable should the venture fail. Therefore
it is understandable that the limited partner was excluded from most man-
agerial functions.29 However, when the general partners wrongfully refuse to
24. See, e.g., Millard v. Newmark & Co., 24 App. Div. 2d 333, 336, 266 N.Y.S.2d 254,
259 (Ist Dep't 1966).
25. Klebanow v. New York Produce Exch., 344 F.2d 294, 298 (2d Cir. 1965). "Although
the state decisions bearing directly on the point are from tribunals not high in the judicial
hierarchy and may be susceptible of distinction, they at least reveal that the New York
courts do not consider § 115 a clear mandate against limited partners' capacity to bring an
action like this." This evaluation of New York law was sharply criticized in Millard v.
Newmark & Co., 24 App. Div. 2d 333, 339-40, 266 N.Y.S.2d 262, 264 (1st Dep't 1966). In
addition, the appellate division, when considering the instant case, claimed that § 115 would
bar such an action. 25 App. Div. 2d at 296, 268 N.Y.S.2d at 859.
26. See, e.g., Cooper Prods. Co. v. Twin Bowl Co., N.Y.L.J., Aug. 21, 1962, p. 8, col. 7
(Sup. Ct.).
27. See, e.g., Klebanow v. New York Produce Exch., 344 F.2d 294, 298 (2d Cir. 1965).
"The purposes of § 115, like that of its less minatory predecessor, were reasonably plain.
General partners need not join limited partners in an action by the partnership; ordinarily
limited partners may not sue since this will interfere with the management by the general
partners . . . a suitor against the partnership need not join a limited partner . . . ." See
Comment, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 1463, 1474-76 (1965); The Association of the Bar of the
City of New York, Comm. on State Legislation, Bull. No. 6, March 13, 1967, pp. 303-04
[hereinafter cited as Committee Bulletin].
28. See Lanier v. Bowdoin, 282 N.Y. 32, 24 N.E.2d 732 (1939); Nadler, The Limited
Partnership Under the Uniform Limited Partnership Act, 65 Com. L.J. 71 (1960).
29. See notes 26 and 27 supra and accompanying text.
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enforce a partnership right, it seems that the interests of the creditors will benefit
rather than suffer by allowing the limited partner to act in accordance with the
holding of the instant case.30
In addition, it would appear that the basic assumption which supports section
115 is that the general partners will make every diligent effort necessary to
prosecute wrongs committed against the partnership.3' Should that assumption
prove to be erroneous, it would seem unreasonable to permit the wrong to go
unpunished,32 leaving the limited partner virtually helpless in his own right.P
By preventing the limited partner from prosecuting such a claim on behalf of
the partnership, his liability, while remaining limited in the absolute sense,
would increase significantly in the practical sense.
The present court, mindful of the lower court rulings which had held limited
partners who attempted to bring suit liable as general partners,34 authorized
the plaintiffs to bring suit "as limited partners."3 5 The court did not specify
whether the limited partner would still be held liable as a general partner for
bringing a derivative suit. The argument could be made, however, that the court,
in allowing them to bring suit "as limited partners" and not as general partners,
indicated an intention to permit suit while retaining limited liability.30 As a
result of the unclear language in the instant case, further judicial or legislative
action might be necessary to clarify the issue.
While most courts had been willing to impose a strict fiduciary duty among
30. The fruits of an action brought on behalf of the partnership by a limited partner
would increase the assets of the firm and thereby make more secure the position of the
creditors of the partnership. See Comment, 40 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1174, 1179 (1965).
31. See Lewis, The Uniform Limited Partnership Act, 65 U. Pa. L. Rev. 715, 717 (1917);
Comment, 40 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1174 (1965).
32. See Lichtyger v. Franchard Corp., 18 N.Y.2d 528, 223 N.E.2d 869, 277 N.Y.S.2d 377
(1966). "To permit stockholders to bring a representative suit but to deny the same
privilege to limited partners would be highly unreasonable." Id. at 537, 223 N.E.2d at 874,
277 N.Y.S.2d at 384.
33. A limited partner is not without any legal rights or remedies in the event of
misconduct on the part of the general partners. N.Y. Partnership Law § 99 gives the limited
partner the right to inspect partnership books, the right to an accounting, and the right to
seek a decree of dissolution. However, none of these remedies would provide an effective and
efficient disposition of a situation such as that presented in the instant case. Moreover, to
require a limited partner to seek dissolution as a means of redress would preclude him from
continuing to profit in the future from what might well be a prospering business.
34. See 18 N.Y.2d at 546, 233 N.E2d at 879, 277 N.Y.S.2d at 390-91. The court referred
to lower court decisions, e.g, Millard v. Newmark & Co., 24 App. Div. 2d 333, 266 N.YS.2d
254 (1st Dep't 1966), which had expressly held limited partners liable as general partners
when they attempted to bring suit on behalf of the partnership.
35. 18 N.Y.2d at 547, 223 N.E2d at 879, 277 N.Y.S.2d at 391.
36. See Committee Bulletin at 305-06. "It is not clear whether this view [that a limited
partner participates in management when he brings a derivative suit] was modified by the
court of appeals' decision in the case. However, it would seem inconsistent to permit a
derivative suit when the general partners who manage the partnership refuse to institute
action, and yet deter the limited partner from asserting his right through fear of sacrificing his
limited liability." Ibid.
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the general partners of a limited partnership,37 few had been willing to extend
that duty to the limited partner.38 However, in Lichtyger v. Franchard Corp.,0
decided on the same day as the instant decision, the court of appeals reasoned
that "there is no basis or warrant for distinguishing the fiduciary relationship
of corporate director and shareholder from that of general partner and limited
partner. '40 General partners, like corporate directors, are in control of the busi-
ness and must deal fairly with the rights and interests of the investors.41 The
Lichtyger court by so holding imposed the same type of fiduciary relationship
as exists within the corporate enterprise. The instant court, to make more em-
phatic its holding in Lichtyger, stated that "there can be no question that a
managing or general partner of a limited partnership is bound in a fiduciary
relationship with the limited partners .... -42 Both decisions48 imposed the
standard of behavior as set forth by the court, speaking through Chief Judge
Cardozo, in Meinhard v. Salmon.44
As a result of such relationship "the limited partners . . . are, therefore,
cestuis que trustent''45 with the managing partners as trustees. Proceeding upon
the fundamental principles of the law of trusts, the cestuis have an equitable
right, 46 independent of statute,47 to sue on behalf of the trust when the trustees
refuse to perform their duty.48
37. The appellate division in the instant case stated that "undoubtedly there must be
an element of mutual trust and confidence between general partners of a limited partnership."
25 App. Div. 2d at 296-97, 268 N.Y.S.2d at 859. See Skolny v. Richter, 139 App. Div. 534,
124 N.Y. Supp. 152 (1st Dep't 1910). "The element of mutual trust and confidence which
is the keynote in the relation between general partners is wholly and conspicuously lacking
[between general partners and limited partners] . . . " Id. at 541, 124 N.Y. Supp. at 157.
38. See, e.g., Soffer v. Glickman, 27 Misc. 2d 721, 209 N.Y.S.2d 743 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
"I hold . . . that the individual defendants [general partners] owed to their partners-
limited though they be-a responsibility of sensitive fiduciary quality within the epic
pronouncement of Meinhard v. Salmon . . . ." Id. at 726, 209 N.Y.S.2d at 749.
39. 18 N.Y.2d 528, 223 N.E.2d 869, 277 N.Y.S.2d 377 (1966).
40. Id. at 536, 223 N.E.2d at 873, 277 N.Y.S.2d at 383.
41. Id. at 536, 223 N.E.2d at 873-74, 277 N.Y.S.2d at 383.
42. 18 N.Y.2d at 547, 223 N.E.2d at 879, 277 N.Y.S.2d at 392.
43. See id. at 547, 223 N.E.2d at 879, 277 N.Y.S. at 392; Lichtyger v. Franchard Corp.,
18 N.Y.2d 528, 536, 223 N.E.2d 869, 874, 277 N.Y.S.2d 377, 384 (1966).
44. 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545 (1928). "Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an
honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior." Id. at 464, 164 N.E. at 546.
45. 18 N.Y.2d at 547, 223 N.E.2d at 879, 277 N.Y.S.2d at 392. See Kiebanow v. Funston,
35 F.R.D. 518, 520 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
46. E.g., Robinson v. Smith, 3 Paige Ch. 222, 232 (1832).
47. Brinckerhoff v. Bostwich, 88 N.Y. 52, 59 (1882).
48. Riviera Congress Associates v. Yassky, 18 N.Y.2d 540, 547, 223 N.E.2d 876, 879, 277
N.Y.S.2d 386, 391 (1966). In Klebanow v. New York Produce Exch., 344 F.2d 294 (2d Cir.
1965), discussed at note 13 supra, the court noted that a limited partner is in a position
analogous to that of a cestui que trustent, but took no decisive position on that issue. It
instead stated that "it makes considerably greater sense to clothe the . . . appellants with
whatever descriptive phrase is necessary to enable them to sue on behalf of the partner-
ship . . . ." Id. at 297.
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Once having established a fiduciary relationship between limited and general
partners, it remains to be seen to what extent that fiduciary duty must be
breached by a general partner before the limited partners' rights will become
activated.49 The instant court only indicated that such action could be brought
"when those in control ... wrongfully decline to do so."5°
Even by limiting the use of a derivative action to situations involving dis-
ability or wrongful refusal, there remains the possibility that the limited partner
might make improprietous use of his newly acquired right.51 The right to a
shareholder's derivative suit has been conditioned,52 and it is expected that simi-
lar conditioning would be needed in the case of a limited partner's suit. The court
has now opened the door to the limited partner and left it to some future court
or to the legislature to impose effective methods of controlling the cases which
will follow.
A bill was before the last session of the New York legislature had as its stated
purpose the codification of the holding of the present case.a This bill 'also in-
corporated the substance of sections 626 and 627 of the New York Business
Corporation Law54 into the New York Partnership Law. To prevent general
liability on the part of the limited partner bringing such a suit, Section 96
would have been modified to the extent that the "commencement of or other par-
ticipation by a limited partner in [a derivative action] ... shall not be deemed to
be taking part in the control of the business within the meaning of this sec-
49. The Klebanow case illustrates a situation in which the general partners did not
refuse to bring suit, but had effectively disenabled themselves from bringing suit. Id. at
295-96. Such a situation might well be excluded by a literal reading of the instant decision.
It could be argued that the reference to Klebanow in the instant case, 18 N.Y.2d at 548, 223
N.E.2d at 880, 277 N.Y.S.2d at 392, indicated an intention to adopt the federal court's
contention that a limited partner may "bring an action on behalf of the partnership when
the general partners have disabled themselves or wrongfully refused . . . ." 344 F.2d at 298.
50. 18 N.Y.2d at 547, 223 N.E2d at 879, 277 N.YS.2d at 391.
51. See Comment, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 1463, 1469-70 (1965) (abuses which existed in
derivative suits, prior to judicial or statutory control).
52. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 626, which in substance provides that while a
shareholder has a right to sue derivatively, he must make a showing that he was a share-
holder both at the time the cause of action accrued and at the time the action was com-
menced. In addition the shareholder must set forth in detail his efforts to obtain corporate
action. And once having commenced such an action, it may not be discontinued without
court approval. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 627 provides that a shareholder, bringing a
derivative suit, holding less than a certain percentage of the outstanding shares or not
having an interest in excess of $50,000, may be required to post security in order to bring
such action.
53. Ass. Intro. No. 3781, Pr. No. 3887, N.Y. State Leg. 190th Sess. (1967) (hereinafter
cited as Assembly Bill]. This bill passed the Assembly on March 7, 1967 and on March 8,
1967 was sent to the Senate Codes Committee. That committee did not report the bill for
floor action; therefore, the bill did not pass during this session of the Legislature. Letter From
State Senator Jay P. Rolison, Jr. to the Fordham Law Review, April 7, 1967, on file in the
Fordham Law Review Office. The bill was recommended by the Law Revision Commission to
clarify and codify the holding in the instant case. Committee Bulletin 303.
54. Assembly Bill §§ 3, 4.
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tion." 5  In addition, section 115 would have been modified"0 to conform the
entire partnership law to the other changes which were to be made.
It would appear that this type of legislation would curtail, at the outset, the
abuses which could follow from the present decision. The requirement of con-
temporaneous ownership5 7 would prevent the purchase of a cause of action; the
requirement of exhausting intra-partnership remedies58 would limit the use of
the derivative suit as a first resort; the requirement of continuing an action,
unless terminated with court approval,59 would prevent secret settlements which
would prefer certain limited partners over others; the payment of the limited
partner's expenses only if he is successful,60 would discourage the commencement
of ill-grounded actions; and the requirement of posting security6 ' would militate
against the commencement of "strike suits" by the owners of less than a sub-
stantial interest in the partnership.
Concededly, sections 626 and 627 of the Business Corporation Law have not
been flawless in their operation or effectiveness. However, until some more effec-
tive solution is proposed, the adoption of such legislation in the partnership field
would certainly obtain for that area the substantial benefits which these sections
have brought to the corporate field, and would be a helpful corollary to the
present decision.
Taxation-Business League Exemption-Bottlers' Association Held To
Qualify for Income Tax Exemption as a NoA-Profit Business League.-
The Pepsi-Cola Bottlers' Association, a non-profit organization, was formed to
promote and improve the business of bottling and selling Pepsi-Cola. Member-
ship in the association was limited to individuals or companies engaged in the
bottling and sale of Pepsi-Cola.1 Virtually all of the members, however, also
bottled other soft drinks.2 The association disseminated reports dealing with im-
proved procedures and equipment used in the bottling industry,3 and conducted
a program of conferences on bookkeeping, accounting methods and management
55. Assembly Bill § 1.
56. Assembly Bill § 2.
57. Assembly Bill § 3.
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid.
60. Ibid.
61. Assembly Bill § 4.
1. As of 1959, approximately 83% of all Pepsi-Cola bottlers in the United States were
members. 369 F.2d 250, 251 (7th Cir. 1966).
2. Ibid. However, members who ceased to bottle Pepsi-Cola were automatically excised
from the organization. Brief for Appellant, p. 2, Pepsi-Cola Bottlers' Ass'n v. United States,
369 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1966).
3. 369 F.2d at 252. Non-member bottlers of Pepsi-Cola also received the news bulletins,
questionnaires and reports. Ibid.
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training for members. 4 The court of appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in affirming
the district court,5 held that the Bottlers' Association was exempt from pay-
ment of income tax as a business league under § 501 (c) (6) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954. Pepsi-Cola Bottlers' Ass'n v. United States, 369 F.2d
250 (7th Cir. 1966).
Section 501(c) (6) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 exempts the follow-
ing organizations from payment of income tax: "business leagues, chambers of
commerce, real-estate boards, or boards of trade, not organized for profit and
no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private share-
holder or individual." Although the Code provides no definition of a business
league, Treasury Regulation § 1.501(c) (6)-1 has defined it to be
an association of persons having some common business interest, the purpose of
which is to promote such common interest and not to engage in a regular business
of a kind ordinarily carried on for profit. It is an organization of the same general
class as a chamber of commerce or board of trade. Thus, its activities should be
directed to the improvement of business conditions of one or more lines of business
as distinguished from the performance of particular services for individual persons.0
The instant court held that the Bottlers' Association was within the scope of
§ 501(c) (6) since the association was a non-profit organization and since
its operations contributed to the improvement of the Pepsi-Cola bottling busi-
ness, thereby incidentiafly benefiting the public consumers.7 However, the regu-
4. Id. at 251-52. In addition, the association reported on types of insurance available
and had auditing, by-laws, nominating and resolutions committees. Ibid.
5. Pepsi-Cola Bottlers' Ass'n v. United States, 65-2 U.S. Tax Cas. t 9705 (NMl. Ill.
1965). The Internal Revenue Service had refused to grant an exemption and plaintiff,
after paying a tax of $4,770, filed a claim for a refund which was denied. A refund action
was commenced in the district court and was decided in favor of the plaintiff. See Brief for
Appellee, p. 4.
6. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c) (6)-1 (1954).
Congress has never indicated any dissatisfaction with the regulation. Treas. Reg. § 74
(1929 ed.), Art. 528; Treas. Reg. § 77 (Rev. Act of 1932), Art. 528; Treas. Reg. § 86
(Rev. Act of 1934), Art. 101(7)-l; Treas. Reg. § 101 (Rev. Act of 1938), Art. 101(7)-1;
Treas. Reg. § 103 (1939 Code), § 19.101(7)1; Treas. Reg. § 111 (1939 Code), § 29.101(7)-1.
These regulations have remained intact while the revenue laws have all contained similar
sections regarding business league exemptions. Rev. Act of 1932, § 103(7), 47 Stat. 169;
Rev. Act of 1934, § 101(7), 48 Stat. 680; Rev. Act of 1936, § 101(7), 49 Stat. 1648; Rev.
Act of 1938, § 101(7), 52 Stat. 447; Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 101(7). It could be argued
that under the reenactment theory, since the statute was continually reenacted with an
interpretative regulation outstanding, the regulation acquired the force of law. Davis, Ad-
ministrative Law 118 (1965 ed.). Even the critics of the reenactment theory would give it
strong authoritative weight, if not more. Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United States,
288 US. 294, 315 (1933).
7. 369 F.2d at 252. The court stated that the "association cannot be disqualified merely
because its members all bottle a particular soft drink product." Ibid. However, see I.T.
4053, 1951-2 Cum. Bull. 53, where the Commissioner held that, under a similar provision
in the 1939 Code, a group of automobile dealers dealing in one specific brand of auto-
mobile, whose purpose was to increase sales through cooperative advertising, wvas not exempt.
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lation s and case law9 dictate that to qualify as a business league an organi-
zation must possess the general characteristics of chambers of commerce,
real-estate boards or boards of trade and have activities that are directed to the
improvement of one or more lines of business. The Bottlers' Association in
the instant case carried on its activities solely for the direct benefit of Pepsi-
Cola bottlers and sellers rather than for the benefit of the bottling business
generally or for the benefit of the community.10 As Judge Kiley noted in his
dissent
bottling Pepsi-Cola is not a line of business. It is only one of a line--one of many
competing businesses in the . . . soft drink industry. And the services rendered by
the Association to its members are not incidental to a general purpose of improving
business conditions. They are essential to an express general purpose, the improve-
ment of the members' competitive position as against non-members,"
Northwestern Municipal Ass'n v. United States'2 held that if an association's
"main purpose is to benefit its [individual members] . . . it is not exempt."' 3
Similarly, in Produce Exch. Stock Clearing Ass'n v. Helvering,14 where the plain-
tiff corporation was formed for the purpose of performing clearing house ser-
vices for its members, the court held the corporation not to be a business
league notwithstanding any incidental benefit to the public or the trade, since
it was formed for the primary purpose of benefiting only its members.'3
It should be noted that the legislative history is not illuminating ap to Congress' specific
intent in enacting the statute itself in 1913. See Note, 40 Va. L. Rev. 467 (1954). See also
Seidman, Legislative History of Federal Income Tax Laws, 1938-1861, 1002-03 (1938).
8. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c) (6)-1.
9. See, e.g., Jockey Club v. United States, 137 F. Supp. 419 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 352
U.S. 834 (1956).
10. 369 F.2d at 253 (dissenting opinion). It should be noted that there was an organi-
zation, the American Bottlers of Carbonated Beverages, that represented the entire soft
drink industry. The purpose of the organization was to deal with improving ethical stan-
dards of that industry. Brief for Appellee, pp. 42-43.
11. 369 F.2d at 253 (dissenting opinion).
12. 99 F.2d 460 (8th Cir. 1938). In that case a group of bond-holding banks formed a
profit making organization to perform refunding operations for municipalities. The benefits
inured directly to the organization and its members.
13. Id. at 463.
14. 71 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1934).
15. Id. at 143-44. In Automotive Elec. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 366 (6th
Cir. 1948), an association of manufacturers, distributors and servicers of automotive equip-
ment, one of whose primary purposes was the publication of catalogues listing products
of its members, was held to be non-exempt. Here the court said the prime consideration
was whether the association was organized and operated for the benefit of members "rather
than for the improvement of business conditions generally." Id. at 368. See also Growers
Cold Storage Co. v. Commissioner, 17 B.T.A. 1279 (1929), where an association was
formed to provide cold storage facilities for its members. In denying exemption the court
reasoned that the benefits were specifically for its members and not for the common interest
of the community or a line of business.
CASE NOTES
A line of business has been interpreted to mean an entire industry,16 or
all components of that industry within a city.17 Exemption has specifically
been denied where the organization dealt with only one brand of product.' 8
Professor Mertens has stated that "a league organized and operated for the pur-
pose of advertising and promoting the sale of a particular product is primarily a
service organization for members and is not entitled to exemption as a business
league in the view of the Revenue Service."' 9
The decisions relied upon by the present court are clearly distinguishable
from the facts of the instant case. In Crooks v. Kansas City Hay Dealers'
Ass'n °2 0 hay merchants formed an association to promote fairness and to raise
the standards of the entire hay business. The Hay Association had no com-
petitors and in effect represented the entire industry. In Associated Indus. v.
Conmissioner,21 the underlying purpose in forming the organization was to
solve critical labor problems that confronted industry in the post-World War I
period. This organization possessed the general characteristics of a chamber of
commerce, with every facet of industry in Cleveland being represented. Its
main purpose was to benefit everyone living in Cleveland, workers and em-
ployers as well, by keeping all the factories open-union shops.2 As such it fell
clearly within the defined description of a business league. In citing National
Leather & Shoe Finders Ass'n v. Commissioner,2 4 the instant court again failed
to recognize that the association there held exempt was formed to promote
the general improvement of business conditions and the training of shoe
repairmen and that it represented the entire leather and shoe finders industry.m
The Pepsi-Cola Bottlers' Association represented only one brand of product
within the soft-drink bottling industry. In light of the facts that the Bottlers'
Association was financed in part by the Pepsi-Cola Company;2 0 that it was
16. National Leather & Shoe Finders Ass'n v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 121, 127 (1947). In
Commissioner v. Chicago Graphic Arts Fed'n, 128 F.2d 424 (7th Cir. 1942), an organization
was upheld as being tax exempt where the organization was comprised of plant owners and
operators in the entire printing industry, whose main purpose was to "promote fairness,
honesty, and better conditions in the graphic arts industry .. . ." Id. at 427. Thus, the associ-
ation had the characteristics of a board of trade whose activities were directed towards the
improvement of business conditions in an entire industry.
17. Commissioner v. Chicago Graphic Arts Fed'n, 128 F.2d 424, 427 (7th Cir. 1942);
Crooks v. Kansas City Hay Dealers' Ass'n, 37 F.2d 83 (8th Cir. 1929); Associated Indus.
v. Commissioner, 7 T.C. 1449 (1946).
18. Brief for Appellant, p. 12. See Rev. Rul. 58-294, 1958-1 Cum. Bull. 244 (licenses of
one patented product) ; I.T. 4053, 1951-2 Cum. Bull. 53 (one specific brand of automobile).
19. 6 Mertens, Federal Income Taxation § 34.20, at 90 (1957). (Footnote omitted.)
20. 37 F.2d 83 (8th Cir. 1929).
21. 7 T.C. 1449 (1946).
22. Id. at 1451. The organization included representatives of various industries including
steel, laundry, bakery, dairy, meat packing, and service trades. Ibid.
23. Id. at 1456.
24. 9 T.C. 121 (1947).
25. Ibid.
26. 369 F.2d at 251; Brief for Appellee, p. 34. The Pepsi-Cola Company, at their
1967]
742 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
formed for the purpose of increasing the sales of Pepsi-Cola; 27 and that its
membership was limited to bottlers and sellers of Pepsi-Cola;28 does not the
holding here permit the Pepsi-Cola Company to "obtain tax exemption for
its creature"2 9 at the expense of its competitors within the soft drink industry?80
expense, hired a firm, to create and operate a young management training program, for
the benefit of members of the Bottlers' Association. Brief for Appellee, appendix, pp. 10-11.
The Company not only ran but paid for a week-long management training conference
for the members. Ibid. The company absorbed much of the costs of the Association's Stan-
dardization Committee. Brief for Appellant, p. S. Pepsi-Cola furnished a custom designed
cost control and accounting system to the Association. Id. at 8.
27. See note 1 supra and accompanying text. It is maintained that the Pepsi-Cola
Company could have furnished these services directly and deducted any expenses as valid
business expenses under the Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 162(a).
28. Brief for Appellant, p. 2. "'iTihere is an integral relationship between the parent
body and the franchised bottlers. . . . The Pepsi-Cola Bottlers Association acknowledges
its role as an advisory arm to the parent organization.'" Id. at 3-4.
29. This was the evil that was expressly hoped to be avoided in Produce Exch. Stock
Clearing Ass'n v. Helvering, 71 F.2d 142, 143 (2d Cir. 1934).
30. See Brief for Appellant, p. 13.
